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THE DEBT DILEMMA
Katherine Porter*
CHARGING AHEAD:

MARKETS.

THE GROWTH AND

REGULATION

OF PAYMENT CARD

By Ronald J. Mann. New York: Cambridge University Press.

2006. Pp. v, 308. Hardcover, $65; paper, $30.
INTRODUCTION

The ubiquity of credit cards in modem economic life inspires much
dismay,' but little nuanced discourse. Lamentations, about undisciplined
consumers or manipulative card issuers, lead to policy prescriptions aimed
at reducing credit card use. Such efforts generally have failed to garner the

support of consumers, who demonstrate continued preference for cards over

cash or checks. 3 These efforts have also roused the ire of opponents to market regulation 4 and the credit industry lobby.5 The current dynamic of
increasing credit card use juxtaposed with regulatory pressure on card markets reflects our society's deep ambivalence about credit cards.6
ChargingAhead: The Growth and Regulation of Payment Card Markets
offers a refreshingly balanced perspective on the optimal use of credit cards.

*
Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. I thank Angie Littwin,
John Pottow, and Tara Twomey for their helpful comments on this Review. Brian Locke provided
able research assistance, and Kati Jumper provided cheerful encouragement.
1. Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 168, 169 (2002) ("The credit card industry has attracted a great deal of criticism for its
aggressive marketing efforts, confusing credit terms, and high interest rates."); Walecia Konrad, How
Americans really feel about credit card debt, BANKRATE.COM, Feb. 20, 2007, http://www.bankrate.com
brm/news/FinancialLiteracy/Feb07_credit-cardpoll-nationalal.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2007).
2.
Examining the Billing, Marketing, and Disclosure Practicesof the Credit CardIndustry,
and Their Impact on Consumers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Sen. Christopher J. Dodd, Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs), available at http://banking.senate.gov/index.cfmFuseaction=
Hearings.Testimony&TestimonyID= 1386&HearingID=246 (last visited Sept. 7, 2007).
3.
See Geoffrey R. Gerdes et al., Trends in the Use of Payment Instruments in the United
States, FED. RES. BULL., Spring 2005, at 180, 184, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
pubs/bulletin/2005/springO5_payment.pdf.

4. See, e.g., DAVID EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL
REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING xii (2000); see also Christopher C. DeMuth, The Case
Against Credit Card Interest Rate Regulation, 3
lems with credit card market regulation).

YALE

J.

ON REG.

201 (1986) (discussing the prob-

5.
Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Soaked by Congress, TIME, May 15, 2000, at 64
(describing strategies of credit lobby used to support bankruptcy reform).
6.
Kathleen Day, A Highly Charged Relationship: Americans Can't Do Without Their
Credit Cards, But the Credit Card Companies Are Another Matter, WASH. POST, May 27, 2007, at
FO 1.
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Authored by Ronald J. Mann, 7 the book manages to be provocative without
resort to polemic. Even rarer, ChargingAhead reveals how payment systems
law-perhaps the most esoteric topic in the already esoteric world of commercial law-shapes our society and its pursuit of the good life. Private
transactions have public effects, and ChargingAhead elucidates the public
effects of our often mindless act of paying with plastic.
The centerpiece of the book is regression analysis of the economic effects of credit cards. Scholars have struggled to understand these
relationships,9 shrouded in the mystery of the Holy Grail, or at least its
commercial law equivalent. Relying on aggregate macroeconomic data from
several countries, Mann establishes consistent and robust relationships between credit card use and increased consumer spending, borrowing, and
debt. He isolates credit card spending-as opposed to credit card debt-as
the significant variable in increased levels of consumer debt (p. 53).
Mann then turns to the relationship between credit card debt and bankruptcy, which he uses as a public measure of financial distress. Mann shows
that borrowing on cards-distinguished from noncard borrowing-is separately associated with bankruptcy filings. Credit card debt, distinct from
consumer debt generally, corresponds with an increased bankruptcy rate. He
posits that bankruptcy and financial distress impose externalities on society
and proposes legal reforms to deter harmful credit card borrowing and reduce the bankruptcy rate. Charging Ahead concludes with a cogent and
carefully circumscribed set of strategies for reshaping American appetites
for credit card use. These reforms aim to moderate the externalities caused
by credit cards without eliminating their efficiency benefits.
This Review explores Mann's empirical analysis and identifies an important limitation inherent in it. Despite Mann's findings, reducing credit
card spending and borrowing would have only a modest effect on reducing
the number of bankruptcies. Decades of research from the Consumer Bankor
ruptcy Project '° show the importance of an adverse event such as job lossthe
illness in precipitating financial collapse." Mann does not fully integrate

7.

Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.

8.

See Larry T. Garvin, The Strange Death of Academic Commercial Law, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.

403,409-10 (2007).
9.
See Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy,
71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 249 (2007); Ian Domowitz & Robert L. Sartain, Determinants of the Consumer
Bankruptcy Decision, 54 J. FIN. 403 (1999); Diane Ellis, The Effect of Consumer Interest Rate Deregulation on Credit Card Volumes, Charge-offs, and the PersonalBankruptcy Rate, BANK TRENDS,
Mar. 1998, at 1, availableat http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/bank/bt_9805.pdf; David B. Gross
& Nicholas S. Souleles, An Empirical Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy and Delinquency, 15 REV.
FIN. STUD. 319 (2002).
10.
ing text.

For a description of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, see infra note 45 and accompany-

TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT
11.
(2000); ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-

CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE (2003); David U. Himmelstein et al., Market
Watch: Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 2, 2005,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.63vl .pdf.
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implications of this research into his conclusions. Credit cards may ratchet
up consumer spending, borrowing, and debt, leading families to divert a
higher percentage of their income to current consumption and debt service
(p. 64). Most bankruptcies, however, are still triggered by a financial shock.
An aggregate examination of the effects of credit cards does not reveal
how card use affects a family's response, or ability to respond, to an adverse
financial event. This shortcoming in Mann's analysis reveals the limitation
of credit card reform to spare families and society the harms of financial
distress. Credit card reform may effectively alter Americans' calculus about
whether to pay with credit cards, but such behavioral change does not itself
provide families with the income and savings necessary to protect them
from adverse financial events. Drawing on original data showing that many
families eschew credit cards after bankruptcy, I highlight the vulnerability of
"cardless" families to financial hardship. This critique applies Mann's aggregate, macroeconomic analysis to the microeconomic context of
individual families and emphasizes the relevance of non-credit card use factors in exposing families to financial stress.
Part I describes the nature of credit card spending and explores the usefulness of Mann's comparative approach to studying credit cards. Part II
evaluates Mann's findings on the overall relationships between individual
credit card transactions and aggregate levels of spending, borrowing, and
bankruptcy. It also briefly analyzes the relationship between his findings and
policy recommendations. Part III explores data on families who refrain from
credit card use and struggle with serious financial distress. Part IV revisits
Mann's policy recommendations in light of this new data. I conclude that
implementing credit card reform would offer families only partial, albeit
valuable, protection from the risks of our modern economy.12

I.

THE POWER OF PLASTIC

Payment cards of all types are growing in popularity. Credit cards combine borrowing and spending capacities in a single plastic instrument-a
key feature that simultaneously enhances the utility and risk of credit cards.
A. Nature of Card Transactions
In America, cash is no longer king. Consumers prefer to pay with plastic
cards, and such payments outnumber both cash transactions and check
transactions (p. 17 fig.1.3). A variety of payment cards exist, including
credit cards, debit cards, and types of stored-value cards, such as payroll
cards or gift cards. Charging Ahead provides a concise and readable explication of the variety of payment cards, focusing on the benefits and burdens
of debit cards versus credit cards.

12. Mann never asserts the contrary. He acknowledges that reducing credit card use "would
not solve the problem [of consumer financial distress] entirely." P. 6.
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Given the ubiquity of cards in our daily lives and their dominance of the
U.S. economy, we probably should know the answer-or at least the reasons

for the question-to the everyday dilemma: "credit or debit?"'' 3 The structure of debit and credit card transactions vary significantly along both
economic and legal dimensions. Lamentations about the decline of cash and
ferocious condemnations of the evils of "paying with plastic" fail to consider fully the differences among card-based transactions or to parse the

effects of such differences. Mann situates credit cards within a timeless
framework of "payment system" devices, showing how concerns about
transaction costs, risk of fraud and error, anonymity,
universality, and final4
ity shape preferences for payment devices.
Mann responds to a substantial, and somewhat surprising, weakness in
prior literature by penning a "defense of credit cards" (p. 37). Rather than
assuming that cards must be superior (or dangerous) simply because they
are a modern innovation, Mann identifies the key benefits of card-based
transactions, both to consumers and to the overall economy. For example,
nearly every consumer has access to a credit card. Card issuers have used
price differentiation and technology to offer cards to nearly every segment

of the market, a strategy that banks have not deployed for many conventional lending products. '5 Credit cards are also ideal for flexible and openended financing because cardholders are excused at the time of the card

transaction from committing to specific terms of repayment (pp. 42-43). On
a larger scale, card transactions are nearly all electronically processed.

Mann reports that the current cost of processing paper checks in the United
States equals about one-half of one percent of the gross domestic product (p.
39 n.5). Thus, the transaction costs savings of card-based transactions are
quite significant. 16 Mann rightly observes that any proposed regulation of

13. P. 33. I refuse to give you the answer here, offering additional encouragement for readers
to open Mann's book for themselves. I will advise that expounding on the "credit/debit" query
makes decent cocktail party conversation, at least among law professors who secretly wonder if they
missed something of significance because they never studied commercial law.
14. RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS xxiii (3d
ed. 2006) (noting "deep structural similarities of all the different payment systems" and giving a few
examples of such similarities).
15. Pp. 40-41. See also Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004)
(analyzing credit card market trends). The expansion of mortgage credit to subprime customers is a
relatively recent phenomenon compared to credit card product differentiation, and the current situation suggests that mortgage lenders may have been less successful in accurately forecasting default
and making lending decisions accordingly. See, e.g., Carrick Mollenkamp, Faulty Assumptions,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2007, at Al; David Streitfeld, The Mortgage Meltdown; Foreclosure Pace
Nears Decade High, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2007, at C1.
16. Many of the benefits of credit cards as a payment device, as opposed to a borrowing
device, are paralleled by debit cards. These transactions are also rapid, electronically processed, and
secure. Indeed, one of the main disadvantages to debit cards instead of credit cards as a payment
device is the law's different treatment of credit and debit cards for fraud or loss protection. P. 29.
Changes to the Truth In Lending Act could level the playing field in this regard between debit and
credit cards, although consumers' knowledge about these rules may be limited. The Check 21 Act
should reduce the costs of processing paper checks. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5001-18 (2000). But payment
cards will still have efficiency advantages such as faster processing at the point of sale.
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credit cards should be evaluated against its potential to weaken or eliminate
the benefits of credit cards (pp. 37, 40, 119, 177).
More than three-quarters of all Americans have one or more credit
cards, 7 and the average number of cards per wallet is estimated to be between seven and eight.' 8 Debit cards, and other plastic cards, are growing,
but have not yet eclipsed the popularity of the credit card in America. Mann
usefully contrasts the advantages of debit cards with credit cards, noting that
some aspects of the law privilege credit cards (p. 29). Understanding such
benefits partially explains Americans' voracious appetite for credit cards and
refutes simplistic arguments that the choice to transact with a credit card is
necessarily profligate.
B. Global Patternsin Card Use
Concern about credit card use is neither novel nor peculiarly American.
Fears about unwise consumer borrowing predate the arrival of the credit
card.' 9 Like many credit innovations, however, the credit card has spawned a
new bout of concern about prodigal spending and overindebtedness. 0 Social
and economic features of different countries shape these worries, but credit
cards inspire nearly universal apprehension.
Mann devotes an entire section of Charging Ahead to exploring the
comparative differences in card use among nations. His explanation is
largely historic, relying on America's role as birth mother of the credit card
and persistent regulatory obstacles in other nations (pp. 91, 114). He concludes that path-dependence is the best explanation for the credit card
phenomenon in America (p. 80). U.S. banks invented the product, and the
predominance of credit cards in Americans' financial lives has markedly
increased in successive generations (pp. 81, 90). Future research could
evaluate the contributing role of alternate explanations. In particular, crosscultural research on behavioral and cognitive differences in individual
spending and borrowing decisions seems likely to yield useful insights.'
17. Brian K. Bucks et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the
2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL., Mar. 22, 2006, at Al, A31,
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/oss/oss2/2004/bullO206.pdf;
Liz Pulliam
Weston, The Truth about Credit Card Debt, MSN MONEY, http://moneycentral.msn.comcontent/
Banking/creditcardsmarts/P150744.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2007).
18. See Frontline: Secret History of the Credit Card (PBS television broadcast Nov. 23,
2004), available at http:l/www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit (last visited Sept. 7,
2007) (reporting that the average American has eight credit cards); Kim Kahn, How Does Your Debt
Compare?, MSN MONEY, https:/www.moneycentral.msn.com/content/SavingandDebt/P7058 1.asp
(last visited Sept. 7, 2007) (stating that the average American has 2.7 bank cards, 3.8 retail cards and
1.1 debit cards for a total of 7.6 cards).
19. LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF SECURED CREDIT 202-08 (1999); see also BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN
THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 251 (2002) (describing concerns in the 1800s that consum-

ers were using bankruptcy protection to obtain credit to purchase luxury items).
20.

See, e.g., Ausubel, supra note 9; Ellis, supra note 9.

21. For example, cognitive errors in evaluating the consequences of borrowing could be
shaped by educational curricula, depending on their attention to rote memorization or problem
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Regardless of its explanation, America's high rate of card use ratchets up
the total harm and total benefit of credit cards. In America, these fears about
credit card use are exacerbated by worry about declining savings.
Americans' strong preference for credit cards may heighten the harmful social consequences of card use. Alternatively, social or cultural factors may
themselves fuel card use, requiring broad reforms that reshape norms about
spending and borrowing. Anxiety about credit cards often disintegrates into
unsupported assertions about the declining moral fiber of Americans.
A comparative approach tests the validity of these arguments. Mann's
analysis employs comparative data on cards and debt from five nations with
large, modem economies: Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom,
and the United States (p. 51). He identifies consistent, empirical effects of
credit cards in these jurisdictions, breaking new ground by establishing a
global pattern of card effects.
Mann is somewhat opaque on the usefulness of his comparative approach. He rightly observes that credit cards are a global phenomenon, but
devotes little space to delineating the benefits of an international perspective
on cards (pp. 3, 51). Imbedded in the structure of his arguments are several
suggestions for how comparative analysis can inform our understanding of
credit cards. First, such research is useful for refuting nationalistic perspectives that rely on the prodigality or restraint of their citizenry to explain
credit card patterns. To the extent a positive relationship between card use
and debt exists in multiple nations, the risk likely derives from features peculiar to credit cards as devices, rather than relating to other economic or
social features of the country (pp. 68-69). This conclusion suggests that interventions that target the unique qualities of credit cards as payment
mechanisms could reduce consumer debt.
Mann's global analysis also makes practical and political points. Depending on their relative use of credit and debit cards, countries will face
different challenges in optimizing payment card preferences. The transactional efficiency of cards as payment and spending devices is a substantial
benefit to be balanced against the drawbacks of card use for consumers. The
potential for credit card reform to alter consumer debt levels is greater in
America than in countries where card use is relatively infrequent. Mann
documents how the United States is "dependent on a credit-centered cards
market to an extent unmatched in any other economy" (p. 4, Part III). The
dominance of credit cards extends both to the number and value of transactions. Along nearly every metric, 2 the United States exhibits a significantly

solving. In some cultures, borrowing may be scorned as a sign of financial distress, rather than
prized as a mark of confidence and entrepreneurial spirit. Mann's prior work in Japan is an exemplar
of this type of research. See Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the United States and
Japan, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1055 (2002). Sociologists and anthropologists who delve more deeply into
shared attitudes in a society could extend this line of research, aiding economists who increasingly
admit that behavior insights can contribute to economic theory.
22. The number of card transactions per capita in Canada modestly exceeds the number in
America. See p. 76 fig.6. 1. This disparity results from the high use of debit cards in Canada. See id.
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greater preference for credit card transactions than other nations do." Other
countries may actually want to foster greater reliance on credit cards to
stimulate efficient small loans, while being attentive to the harms of wide-

spread card use that Mann isolates. Correspondingly, the financial stakes of
such reform for consumers and the card industry are higher in America.
Putting America's card use in global context explains Mann's pessimism
24
about the likelihood of credit card reform. The dominance of large, na-

tional banks in the credit card market 2' and the weak enforcement activity of
26

their regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, compound
the difficulties of achieving and implementing credit card reform. In the face
of these challenges, Charging Ahead nonetheless manages to articulate a

persuasive
agenda for credit card reform that has international applicabil27
ity.

II.

CONSEQUENCES OF CARD USE

Having built an argument for the advantages of payment cards and described their relative importance across economies, Mann then constructs a
model to measure the effects of credit cards on consumer spending and borrowing. He teases out the positive relationship between credit card use and
bankruptcy, isolating the particular aspects of credit cards (distinct from
other payment cards) that may drive increased financial distress.

23.
Mann uses data from 2001 for each of these comparisons. In America, debit cards are a
significantly newer product than credit cards. EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 4, at 297. Perhaps
as Americans gain more familiarity with debit cards, use of debit cards will climb. This may or may
not result in a decline in credit card use, depending on whether debit cards substitute for cash or
check transactions or erode use of credit cards.
24.
P 207 ("I am realistic enough to recognize the political implausibility of what I propose."). The card issuers apparently share Mann's view. See Capital One Fin. Group, Annual Report
(Form 10-K), at 16-17 (Mar. 1, 2007) (noting that although Congress is holding hearings on credit
card regulations, analysts believe broad regulatory changes are unlikely).
25.
Ten credit card issuers control over eighty-four percent of the credit card market share. The
top three issuers--Chase, Citibank, and MBNA (now part of Bank of America)--control nearly half of
the market. Card Chiefs, CARDTRAK.COM, Feb. 4, 2005, http://www.cardweb.com/cardtrak/news/2005/
february/4a.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2007) (citing www.carddata.com).
26.
Credit Card Practices: Current Consumer and Regulatory Issues: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. (2007)
[hereinafter Credit Card Practices Hearing], available at http://www.house.gov/appsllist/hearing/
financialsvcs dem/hr042607.shtml (last visited Sept. 7, 2007) (written testimony of Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School, 13-20, available at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs-den/htwilmarth042607.pdf).
27.
Mann reveals his own biases in undertaking the research and acknowledges his own
surprise at his recommendations (pp. 6, 207). Whether a calculated tactic to persuade other skeptical
readers or a natural product of Mann's (successful) effort to make the book more readable, Mann's
personal voice enhances the reader's connection to his analysis.
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A. Untangling CardSpending and Card Borrowing
Mann's empirical analysis establishes a positive relationship between
credit card use and increased consumer debt. 8 Neither the concise nature of
the foregoing sentence nor its "obviousness" to an armchair empiricist
should diminish the power of Mann's achievement. People repeatedly have
denied the existence of any such effects of credit cards, including in Congressional hearings on the need for credit card reform.2 9 Charging Ahead
should quash such unsupported assertions. The debate should now advance
to an examination of the desirability of the established effects of credit cards
on consumer behavior.
The empirical core of the book, Chapter 4, analyzes the relationships between aggregated credit card spending, credit card debt, and consumer debt.
Mann pays only fleeting attention to the relationship between card use and
savings. Instead, he focuses on the nexus between credit cards and debt.
Card spending and card borrowing are combined in a model with total consumer debt and macroeconomic conditions (p. 58 tbl.4.4). Mann finds that
credit card spending, rather than credit card debt, is the significant factor
that correlates with total consumer debt. An increase in $100 of credit card
spending corresponds, one year later, with a $105 increase in total consumer
debt (p. 54). This relationship is statistically significant when credit card
spending and credit card debt are considered simultaneously and when total
consumer debt is lagged by one, two, or three years (p. 57 tbl.4.2).
As credit cards become more favored payment devices, countries experience an increase in overall consumer borrowing (p. 53, 57 tbl.4.2). This
relationship reinforces the findings of psychologists and credit industry researchers that paying with a credit card increases spending.3' However,
credit card borrowing has no separate effect on total debt. Frequent credit
card use as a payment device heightens consumers' total borrowing, regardless of whether the card transaction is paid when consumers get their
statements. Put another way, card use does drive consumer debt upward, but
much of that borrowing occurs in forms other than credit cards.
Mann terms this spending-debt relationship of credit cards an "instrument-induced risk" (p. 119). Other forms of plastic payment-most
prominently debit cards--offer the efficiency benefits of credit cards but
may not stimulate overall debt. By isolating the dangers of credit cards' dual
28. The operative word in this sentence is "use." Mann's analysis does not focus solely on
credit card debt or credit card spending but considers the separate and combined effects of the two
functions of credit cards-payment and borrowing.
29. P. 53 n.27; Credit Card Practices Hearing, supra note 26 (testimony of Todd Zywicki,
Professor of Law, George Mason University Law School, 5-8,12, available at http://www.house.
gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs-dem/htzywicki042607.pdf); id. (written statement of Oliver I.
Ireland, partner, Morrison & Foerster, 2, available at http://www.house.gov/appslist/hearing/
financial svcs_dem/htireland042607.pdf).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 76-78. He points to widespread variation in government social services as a barrier to comparing savings data across nations (pp. 55-56).
31. P. 48. These studies focused on individual consumer behavior, not aggregate effects, and
usually studied only one transaction or transactions at a particular business.
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function as a spending and borrowing device, Mann justifies narrow reform
of credit cards that would tweak the structure of card transactions to shift
spending transactions onto debit cards (p. 120).32
B. The Bankruptcy Connection
Higher levels of consumer debt may not be a cause for concern. Borrowing can fuel economic growth, spur entrepreneurial activity, and enhance
consumer quality of life. On the other hand, debt is the sine qua non of
bankruptcy because the major economic benefit of bankruptcy is a discharge
of most unsecured debts.33 Mann uses bankruptcy as a proxy for financial
distress throughout Charging Ahead. However, financial distress does not
always lead to bankruptcy and, in fact, may occur without debt.34 Extrapolating from bankruptcy to financial distress is further complicated by different
legal regimes of debt relief among the countries that Mann studies (pp. 64,
66). Notwithstanding these issues, bankruptcy is the best available public,
tangible way to quantify financial distress; no other measure of financial
distress is comparable between nations. Further, research confirms that
nearly all families arrive in bankruptcy in deep financial distress, struggling
with both high debts and low incomes.3"
Mann posits that financial distress generates externalities that society
must bear collectively and imposes serious consequences on individuals
other than the borrower.16 He relies on these externalities to justify his concern with any effect of credit cards on bankruptcy filings. Mann does not
profess any sympathy for the plight of individuals suffering from debt.
Claiming that his "approach is intended to be solely economic," Mann emphasizes the social costs of financial distress to nonborrower parties

32. Presumably, Mann disciplines himself to use a credit card only when he intends to finance a transaction and relies on a debit card for spending activity. Despite my complete agreement
with his conclusion about the appropriate relative uses of debit versus credit cards, I would never
show Mann my credit card statement. Behavioral and cognitive barriers may hinder policy efforts to
switch consumers to debit cards from credit cards. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
33.

See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2000).

34. Most obviously, a family can experience an income shortage (for example, caused by
unemployment, the failure of an ex-spouse to pay support, or the death of a wage-earner) and not
have any debt. The family simply has too few dollars to pay for necessary expenses; we may say
that such families are "broke" but note that bankruptcy provides no income assistance to aid these
families. See Katherine Porter & Deborah Thome, The Failureof Bankruptcy's Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 121 (2006).
35.
See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 70--72; cf MARTIN RYAN, THE LAST RESORT: A
STUDY OF CONSUMER BANKRUPTS 95, 128 (1995) (reporting income and debt figures from study of
Australian bankruptcy debtors).
Pp. 49-50. Marshalling existing literature, he identifies several externalities of financial
36.
distress: harm to the dependents of the debtor, strain on the welfare safety net, reduction in workers'
economic productivity, and losses to other creditors.
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(pp. 62-63) and assumes that at some undocumented level these externalities exceed the benefits from increased borrowing.37
The book then examines the possible role of credit cards in financial distress. Mann deploys a regression analysis on aggregate, comparative data to
isolate the effects of credit cards, macroeconomic factors, and countryspecific differences on rates of bankruptcy. His key finding is that a rise in
credit card debt leads to higher bankruptcy rates. 38 This effect does not depend on the significant and positive relationship between overall borrowing
and bankruptcy. Even when overall borrowing is held constant, increased
credit card borrowing correlates with higher bankruptcy rates (p. 66). Mann
finds that "an increase of $100 per capita in credit card debt would increase
bankruptcy filings by about 200 filings per million" (p. 67). Bankruptcy
rates climb as consumers exhibit stronger preferences for credit card borrowing over other forms of borrowing and as overall borrowing increases.39
Mann uses the effects of time lags to establish which direction the relationship runs-from credit card use to bankruptcy rather than vice versa. A oneyear lag is the best fit for the model, but the effects increase with longer lag
periods. On the strength of this analysis, Mann suggests that regulating
credit cards could reduce the bankruptcy rate and, by broader implication,
the amount of financial distress in a society.
Applying Mann's insights on these macroeconomic relationships to the
behavior of individual families is complex. As Mann acknowledges, aggregate data do not reveal how the effects of credit card use are distributed
across individual families. 4 The distribution could show that either a relatively small number of families in bankruptcy borrowed quite heavily on
credit cards before bankruptcy or that nearly all families in bankruptcy
modestly increased their credit card borrowing before bankruptcy. Identifying this pattern is critical to formulating effective credit regulation. Reforms
could broadly target all users of credit cards, or alternatively, their impact
could be limited to the types of families for whom credit cards create a particular risk of future financial distress.
Increased credit card use may precede bankruptcy for a variety of reasons. Families could borrow, in Mann's words, with a "calculated
indifference" to their repayment obligations (p. 63). These "strategic" debtors are posited to load up on debt before using bankruptcy as a financial
planning tool to escape from their obligations.4 ' Alternatively, families could

37. See John A.E. Pottow, Private Liabilityfor Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REV. 405, 412 ("To be sure, the case for negative bankruptcy externalities is more intuitive than
empirical at this juncture.").
38. Mann ran this model with varying lags between the independent variables and the bankruptcy rate. The sign and size of the coefficients were similar in each model. P. 71 tbl.5.3.
39.

Ausubel, supra note 9, at 253; see also Ellis, supra note 9.

40. Mann notes that aggregate data cannot explain the reasons that people have large
amounts of credit card debt. P. 62.
41.
Credit Card PracticesHearing, supra note 26 (testimony of Todd Zywicki, Professor of
Law, George Mason University Law School, 5-12, available at http://www.house.gov/apps/
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borrow in response to an adverse event that causes a change in their income
or expenses. If the adverse event is severe, these families could "crash" into
bankruptcy mired in huge credit card debts that they could not repay even
after the adverse situation abated. In yet another scenario, families could
borrow gradually to improve their standard of living during times of financial stability, and this borrowing could heighten their overall financial risk
(p. 64). Card use increased these families' risk to a financial shock, helping
them "slide" into deeper distress and, ultimately, bankruptcy. There are
doubtless other formulations, and I suspect that families may use credit
cards differently as staged responses to their deepening financial distress. 42
Charging Ahead abandons an effort to untangle these relationships, relying
on the aggregate relationship of cards to debt and bankruptcy to justify its
reforms. To hone such regulation, research must examine how card use and
its consequences vary among families and be cognizant of the importance of
non-credit card factors in causing financial distress.
III.

BROKE WITHOUT BORROWING

To illustrate the limits of the relationship between cards and financial
distress, I offer original empirical data on "cardless" families. This sample
comes from a longitudinal study of consumer bankruptcy debtors. These
families virtually all incurred substantial credit card debt before bankruptcy,
but many of them eschew credit cards after bankruptcy. The survey and interview data that I use herein enrich and complement Mann's findings in
Charging Ahead, illustrating the importance of family-level analysis of how
credit card decisions map to financial well-being.
I find that despite restraint from any credit card use, many families report a worsening financial situation after a bankruptcy. On a microeconomic
level, these families highlight a limitation of credit card reform. Cards may
heighten a family's risk, but the cards themselves do not create adverse financial events or low incomes.
A. Methodology
A vast majority of Americans have credit cards. 43 Given the ubiquity of
credit cards in modem life, it is difficult to obtain a sample of non-credit
card users for comparative analysis. The dataset of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project III ("CBP") facilitates study of how families' financial
situations are related to credit card use because many families avoid credit
list/hearing/financialsvcs-dem/htzywicki042607.pdf); Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the
"Sweat Box" of Credit CardDebt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 375,403 n. 16.

42. Cf Sumit Agarwal et al., The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions Over the Lifecycle
(Mass. Inst. of Tech. Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 07-11, 2007), available at http://papers.
ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=973790 (analyzing how borrowing decisions change over
individuals' lifetimes).
43. 74.9% of families had credit cards in 2004. Bucks et al., supra note 17, at A3 1; see also
Weston, supra note 17.
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cards after bankruptcy." I term this group "cardless" families, a concept developed further in this section.
The CBP is a multiresearcher, interdisciplinary study of American consumer bankruptcy cases filed in 2001.4' The core sample consisted of 1250
cases drawn equally from five judicial districts. The core sample contains
both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases,47 but I limit the analysis here to Chapter 7 cases. Because families who file Chapter 13 remain under court
supervision for a period of years, their financial decisions are regulated and
monitored. 48 The sample was constructed by asking bankruptcy debtors to
complete a written survey that was distributed at a mandatory meeting during the bankruptcy process. As with most survey research, selection bias
could limit the sample's usefulness in generalizing about the bankrupt population, but a high response rate and prior analysis soften this concern. 49 The
cases in the CBP sample were filed in 2001, more than four years before the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005. 50 Although that law made extensive changes to the consumer
bankruptcy system, the reforms do not limit the data's usefulness for examining how card use bears on financial distress.
Four instruments provide data: the initial survey; public bankruptcy
court records that detail each debtor's assets, liabilities, and income; a telephone interview conducted approximately one year after each debtor's
bankruptcy; and a telephone interview conducted approximately three years
after each debtor's bankruptcy. Response bias is a potential flaw with all
instruments other than the court records. Mann identifies this drawback of
survey data as a benefit of his aggregate approach, noting that families may
be unable to accurately report their borrowing activity (p. 61). The blunt
reality is that no ideal data set for household-level financial analysis is cur-

44. Regardless of the actual size of the household, a debtor's marital status, or whether the
bankruptcy case was filed as a single or joint petition, I use the word "families" to describe the
individual or individuals who filed bankruptcy and their dependents, if any.
45. Several published accounts have extensively described the methodology of the Consumer
Bankruptcy Project. See WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 11, at app.; Robert M. Lawless & Elizabeth
Warren, The Myth of the Disappearing Business Bankruptcy, 93 CAL. L. REv. 743, 769 (2005);
Porter & Thorne, supra note 34, at app. The Consumer Bankruptcy Project was funded by the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the Ford Foundation, Harvard Law School, and New York University Law School. All data from the CBP included in this Review is on file with the author.
46. The five districts sampled were Central District of California, Northern District of Chicago,
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Middle District of Tennessee, and Northern District of Texas.
47. Of the 1250 cases, 780 were filed as Chapter 7 bankruptcies. The remaining 470 were
Chapter 13 cases.
48. Katherine Porter, Bankrupt Profits: The Credit Industry's Business Model for Postbankruptcy Lending, 93 IOWA L. REv. (forthcoming May 2008) (manuscript at 46) (explaining legal
constraints on credit access after filing Chapter 13 bankruptcy).
49.

See Porter & Thorne, supra note 34, at 127.
50. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified in scattered sections of titles 11,12, 15, 18, and
28 of the United States Code).
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rently available.5' CBP data, however, can be useful to illuminate the interplay between credit cards and financial distress, even without requiring
debtors to recall and divulge details about their credit card activity. The findings below do not purport to be definitive on the relationship between credit
cards and financial distress but instead may modestly improve our knowledge on this complex dynamic. This perspective seeks to enrich and

supplement Mann's work, rather than disprove it.
There are benefits and drawbacks to using a sample of former bank-

ruptcy debtors for analyzing how card use affects financial health. A
principal advantage is that bankruptcy debtors are not inherently adverse to

or unfamiliar with credit cards. At the time of their bankruptcy, such families are even more likely to have credit cards than the general American
population. CBP court record data show that 91.44% of all bankruptcy debt52
ors had at least one credit card obligation. Further, these families virtually
all incurred substantial credit card debt before bankruptcy.53 Before bankruptcy, these families relied heavily on cards to make ends meet. Yet, after
bankruptcy, many debtors report having no credit cards at all.54 According to
the CBP, about one-third of families who filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy still do
not have a single credit card three years after bankruptcy. 5 Comparing these
"cardless" families with cardholding families offers a novel perspective on
credit card use and financial health.
The drawback to a sample of bankruptcy debtors is obvious. Because
these families filed bankruptcy, their financial practices and experiences are
not typical of all Americans. The cardless families in my sample are not
identical, or necessarily even similar, to nonbankrupt American families
who refuse to use credit cards, relying exclusively on other payment or borrowing devices. Neither are cardholding families representative of American
credit card users in general. Bankruptcy itself may be a transformative eco-

51.
Credit card companies have excellent data on individual level card use. Given the size of
the largest card issuers, each company has a portfolio that reflects a diverse sample of households
along demographic and economic criteria. The problem, of course, is that these data are not available for public use. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
52. N = 1250. It is possible that other debtors had credit cards at the time of their bankruptcy
but did not owe any debts on these cards so they were omitted from the bankruptcy court records on
debts. However, given the financial distress of the families at the time of their filing, any such effect
seems unlikely or very small. Credit card debt is more frequently found in Chapter 7 cases (96.4 1%)
than Chapter 13 cases (83.40%), a finding that is worth more detailed analysis than permitted in this
Review.
53. The median Chapter 7 debtor in the core sample of the CBP owed $19,404 in credit card
debt (including retail and charge cards) at the time of their bankruptcy filing. The credit card debt
data were obtained from each debtor's court records. Because credit card debts appear with other
unsecured debts on debtors' bankruptcy forms, it is difficult to identify credit card debts with a high
degree of accuracy.
54. Porter, supra note 48, at 27 (finding that one year after bankruptcy, only twenty-five
percent of Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtors report having accepted any new form of credit).
55. The second round of telephone interviews was completed by 302 debtors, and the question on current credit cards was answered by 300 debtors. Thirty-four percent (102) of these families
reported that they had no credit cards at all. This included both new cards accepted after bankruptcy
and any cards that may have survived their bankruptcy (perhaps because they reaffirmed the debt).
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nomic moment, radically altering the spending and borrowing habits of
families. I rely exclusively on a comparative analysis between cardholding
and cardless families, each group of which filed bankruptcy. While the findings may not be generalizable to all Americans, they present a framework
for future individual-level research on the effects of credit card use.
B. Income and FinancialWell-being of
Cardless and CardholdingFamilies

Analysis of individual-level data from the CBP shows that cardless families have different economic profiles than families who have credit cards.
The most notable difference is that postbankruptcy families who use credit
cards report higher incomes. Approximately three years after their bankruptcies, families in the study reported their annual household income before
taxes. 16 Analysis shows a statistically significant relationship between
whether a family has credit cards and its household income. The average
family with credit cards has $50,665 of annual pre-tax income. The average
cardless family has about one-third less income, reporting household earnings of $37,255." 7 This difference is statistically significant. 58 The median
figures reflect the same pattern. Cardholding families earn more household
income. The median for this group is $40,000, compared to $32,000 for
cardless families. Families without credit cards have lower household incomes than families who have cards.

56. This income question was more likely to be refused than most questions, which is typical
in surveys. See John R. Pleis & James M. Dahlhamer, Family Income Nonresponse in the National
Health Interview Survey (NHIS): 1997-2000, 2003 AM. STAT. Ass'N SEC. SURV. RES. METHODS
3309, available at http://www.amstat.org/Sections/SrmslProceedings/y20031Files/JSM2003000666.pdf. Of the 302 Chapter 7 debtors who completed the three-year mark telephone interviews,
275 answered the question on income. Id.
57. These figures are in 2004 dollars. Adjusted to 2006 dollars, the average card-holding
family would earn $54,071, and the average cardless family would earn $39,760.
58. A t-test was performed to measure whether the difference between the means was statistically significant. t = -2.643. p = .009.
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FIGURE I
FAMILY INCOME AFTER BANKRUPTCY
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The income divide among card users and noncard users shown in Figure 1 has a number of possible explanations. One possibility is that families
with lower incomes after bankruptcy remain too risky to attract credit card
lenders. This is not a very likely hypothesis because the rampant marketing
of credit cards to families after bankruptcy means nearly everyone can get a
credit card.59 The lesson of ChargingAhead is that credit cards are linked to
financial distress. Yet, with this sample of families, the indications seem to
point in the opposite direction. Families without cards are trying to make
ends meet with fewer dollars. Refraining from cards during the years after
bankruptcy does not seem to have improved these families' financial profiles, although the data do not address the possibility that only families with
higher incomes chose to accept credit cards. A lower income reduces a family's ability to deal with unexpected expenses, sharpening the effect of an
adverse event. Surprisingly, these cardless families appear to be at greater
risk of further hardship than their card-carrying counterparts.
Other CBP data reinforce the income finding. Card use correlates with
the trajectory of a family's self-reported financial well-being. Families were
asked to compare their financial situation at the time of the interview approximately three years after bankruptcy with their financial situation
immediately after they filed for bankruptcy. 60 Families with credit cards
were more likely to report that their financial situation had improved as
59.

See Porter, supra note 48, at 40; Caroline E. Mayer, Bankrupt and Swamped with Credit

Offers, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2005, at Al.

60. The exact query posed was, "When you compare your financial situation NOW with
your financial situation immediately AFTER you filed for bankruptcy, has it improved, stayed about
the same, or gotten worse?" Three families chose the response that they "didn't know" the answer to
this question. Data are from the 299 respondents who answered the question.
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years elapsed after their bankruptcy. Cardless families were overrepresented
in the group whose financial situation had worsened postbankruptcy. 6' These
differences were statistically significant. 62 Refraining from cards does not
seem to have aided these families in improving their financial situations.

FIGURE 2
SELF-REPORTED CHANGE IN FINANCIAL SITUATION THREE YEARS AFTER
BANKRUPTCY
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One interpretation of these correlations is that credit cards themselves

may be a reason that families report an improved financial situation. Cards
may give a family a false sense of financial health by allowing it to increase
its spending. By borrowing on cards to meet expenses, the cards could be

boosting their living standard. While these families are incurring debt to
achieve this effect, the low minimum payments on card balances alleviate
the immediate pinch. 63 It may take years for families to appreciate the consequences of card use. Cardless families who must pay cash come to direct
61.
It is disheartening to see any substantial fraction of families report that their financial
situation has worsened after their bankruptcy. This erosion of bankruptcy's fresh start just three
years after bankruptcy exposes the difficulty that some families have in achieving and sustaining
financial recovery-despite a bankruptcy discharge. The findings reported here come from the second round of interviews conducted three years after bankruptcy. Previous research has analyzed how
families fare one year after bankruptcy and examined the reasons that some families report postbankruptcy financial problems. See Porter & Thorne, supra note 34.
62. A chi-square analysis was used to evaluate the data. The Pearson chi-square value was
10.743. The p-value was .005.
63. See p. 194 n.21; Memorandum from Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Account
Management and Loss Allowance Guidance 3 (Jan. 8, 2003), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/press/bcreg/2003/20030108/attachment.pdf.
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terms with the economic realities of their incomes each month. In this way,
cards could facilitate financial distress in the long term because they permit
a family to defer difficult budgeting issues. This dovetails with the observation in ChargingAhead that the unique element of credit cards is their dual
function as either a payment device or a borrowing device. Because consumers can decide later whether they wish to pay off their charges or finance
them over time, the spending decisions and borrowing decisions occur separately. Consumer Bankruptcy Project data do not reveal the degree to which
cardholding families used their credit cards for spending or borrowing. In
the short-term, however, card use corresponds with an upward-trending financial outlook.
Another measure of a family's financial situation is their ability to meet
current expenses. In the CBP interviews, families were asked whether they
were struggling to pay a particular type of bill.64 Responses to this inquiry
are shown in Figure 3. For every bill, cardless families were more likely to
report difficulty in payment. However, the differences between cardholders
and the cardless were not statistically significant for each bill. 65 Life insurance, homeowners' insurance, medical bills, and utility bills were significant
at the ten-percent level. Phone bills were significant at the one-percent level.
These data offer additional support for the prior finding that postbankruptcy
families without credit cards experience greater financial difficulties.

64. The following language was used for this question: "Some people have told us that even
after bankruptcy, they are still struggling to pay some of their bills. As I read the following list,
would you tell me if you are struggling to pay that type of bill?" The list included credit card bills,
health insurance, life insurance, homeowners'/renters' insurance, automobile insurance, medical
bills, utility bills (heat, water, garbage, etc.), phone bills, taxes (property and income), mortgage or
rent payments, student loan payments, and child support or alimony.
65. The chart below gives the value of the Pearson coefficient and the related p-value for
each type of bill.
Health
Insurance

Life
Insurance

HomelRent
Insurance

Car
Insurance

Pearson
Chi-Square 1.213
p-value
0.271

3.523
0.061

2.646
0.100

0.120

3.422

3.32

7.462

0.729

0.064

0.068

0.006 0.563

Medical
Bills

Utilities

Phone Taxes
0.334

Mortgage/
Rent
1.159
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With the exception of medical bills, none of the bills shown in Figure 3
are usually paid with credit cards, although increasingly every type of bill
can be paid this way.6 Assuming that families in both groups are paying
most of these bills with a payment form other than a credit card (such as a
check or automatic bank account withdrawal), cardless families' increased
difficulty in bill paying is provocative. Cardholding families may be making
routine use of cards for routine purchases such as food or clothing. That
credit card spending at the checkout lane may become credit card borrowing
at bill-paying time, freeing up families' incomes to meet other expenses. By
stretching their incomes further, these families may find it easier to pay their
monthly bills.
Along three measures of financial well-being (income, self-reported financial status, and difficulty with bill-paying), I find that families who
eschew credit cards after bankruptcy fare worse than those who accept
cards. Aggregate data may show a strong and positive relationship between
credit card use and bankruptcy in the aggregate, but at an individual level
the effects of credit cards on financial well-being are complex.
C. Conclusionsfrom Research
My findings demonstrate that credit card use does not necessarily correlate with worse financial outcomes for individual families. Indeed among
66.

See, e.g., Lingling Wei, AmEx PlansMortgage Rewards,

WALL ST.

J., May 23, 2007, at
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former bankrupts, those who have cards seem to be better off than those
who lack cards. These data illustrate the usefulness of individual-level empirical research for assessing the potential of credit card reform. The
findings also support my critique that credit card reform is an incomplete
solution to the problem of financial distress.
As a prefatory matter, I emphasize that my data are from families who
filed for bankruptcy. Research on a broader population may show a different
pattern between credit cards and financial well-being. With the findings presented here, the principal accomplishment perhaps is to emphasize the
potential to test the aggregate dynamic between cards and financial distress
on a household level, rather than relying solely on aggregate data.
Notwithstanding this limitation, these data are provocative because they
confound expectations about credit cards and financial distress and refute
the general relationship that Mann identifies in Charging Ahead. Spinning
out the reasons for these findings highlights the complexity of the connection between credit cards and financial distress. One hypothesis is that
families who accept cards actually achieve improved financial situations.
Cardholding families earn higher incomes and are more likely to report improved financial situations. At least for the relatively short period measured
by these data (three years), cards do not correlate with financial harms. This
outcome may reflect postbankruptcy families' heightened awareness about
the risks of cards. Having incurred substantial credit card debts before filing
bankruptcy, some families may refrain from accepting a credit card if their
financial situation is tenuous or their income is low. These consumers may
remember the ways credit cards contributed to their financial collapse into
bankruptcy and consciously be refusing to obtain credit cards for fear of
worsening their financial prospects. This behavior toward credit cards could
be particularly prevalent among the bankrupt sample examined here. Data
on the general population could test whether a similar pattern exists: do
people stop using cards if they struggle to pay credit card debts? 67 The results would help measure the extent to which bankruptcy transforms
61
financial decision making, particularly with regard to discretionary spending. Families may themselves be capable of making insightful choices about
whether they can manage a credit card, but such lessons may only be
learned through years of experience and painful struggle to repay card debts.
A related hypothesis is that cardholding families may be less likely to
report a strained financial situation because their use of credit cards deludes
them about the realities of their financial condition. On a family level and in
the short term, credit cards may be palliative, masking the pain of income
shortages, unexpected expenses, or prodigal behavior. Credit cards may delay families from facing difficult financial realities; the ability to borrow on

67. See Angela K. Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit Card Use and Preference
Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 tx. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (reporting that non-bankrupt,
low-income women who had difficulty repaying credit card debts gradually reported trying to avoid
credit cards and use other forms of borrowing).
68.

See generally Porter, supra note 48.
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cards buoys their perceived financial status and aids them in paying bills.
This function of a credit card seems destructive, at least if used in this manner for any sustained period. Confronting the realities of their financial
situations without resort to borrowing may give families the best options for
responding to financial pressures from gaps between income and expenses.69
While credit cards may relieve the strain of short-term financial distress, the
findings in Charging Ahead suggest that, in the aggregate, the use of credit
cards increases financial distress. More research on the relationship between
upward-trending card use and bankruptcy at the individual level would help
determine whether cards are a useful "lifeline" for families struggling with
financial distress (p. 63), or just a "cement life raft," which families cling to
as their distress deepens into financial collapse or bankruptcy. °
This brief look at a particular subset of "cardless" families-former
bankruptcy debtors-suggests that policymakers should refrain from pinning too much hope on credit card reform to substantially reduce financial
distress. Card reform is likely to reduce the bankruptcy rate, as Mann shows,
but the data highlight the reality that families will nonetheless continue to
suffer from the economic fallout of job layoffs, illness, injury, or divorce.
Helping families weather these adverse events may require more than credit
card reform.
IV. REDIRECTING

CARD REFORM

Charging Ahead proposes several legal reforms that could reduce the
contribution of cards to financial distress. Rather than complain that these
reforms are too tentative, I critique the tendency in current policymaking to
view sweeping credit card reform as a panacea for bankruptcy and financial
distress. Collectively, the greater hardship of the cardless postbankruptcy
families highlights the limits of credit card reform to reduce financial distress. I end the Review with brief discussion of how payment cards
(including credit cards) could actually be incorporated into solutions for
financial distress.
A. The Limits of CardRegulation
The regulatory proposals in Charging Ahead are designed to constrain
undesirable credit card use. Mann divides these reforms into two categories.
The first group of proposals attempts to curb the use of credit cards as a
payment device because credit card spending (apart from credit card debt)
increases total consumer debt (Part IV). The thrust of these proposals is to
regulate interactions between cardholders and card issuers. Each reform is
relatively modest in scope, targeting a limited aspect of cards' attractiveness
as payment devices, such as affinity programs (pp. 167-71). Given the bil-

69.

WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 11, at 266.

70.

Id. at 123-62.
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lions of card transactions each year, however, a slight shift in consumer
payment preferences could dramatically lower overall consumer debt.
The second group of reforms tackles the ways in which credit cards may
stimulate undesirable borrowing (Part V). Mann is cautious here, exhibiting
a libertarian fear of overregulation and an economic deference to the overall
benefits of borrowing (pp. 178, 188, 207). Policymakers should carefully
consider Mann's recommendations, but not allow them to distract their attention from the underlying causes of financial distress. Credit card reform
should dampen the bankruptcy rate, but it does not substitute for improving
the social safety net to catch those who experience dramatic income losses
or catastrophic expenses from illness or injury.
The cardless families offer an illustrative reminder that financial distress
can occur without credit cards. Job layoffs, cancer, premature infants, and
failed marriages are exogenous to card use.7 ' On an individual level, cards
may be used differently by some families than others, and cards themselves
do not cause the adverse events that exist in the vast majority of bankruptcies. Along these lines, a cardless family's greater likelihood of
experiencing a precarious financial situation after bankruptcy illustrates the
multiple contributors to financial risk. The lower incomes of cardless families make it harder for them to save. These families simply have fewer
dollars to meet routine bills and thus fewer dollars left for savings. Admonitions to save do not tell these families how to make ends meet on incomes
that are below those of most American families.72 The ability to save turns,
in part, on the ability to earn. Yet, it is hard to see how card use determines
income. The cardless family data make a simple point: one can eliminate
cards entirely for a sustained period of years and still face privations and
eroding financial health.
While Mann convincingly shows that, in sum, increasing card use leads
to more bankruptcies, cards are only part of a family's debt dilemma. Indeed, cards may be merely the "front man" for bankruptcy, miring families
in more debt, thus heightening a family's vulnerability to bankruptcy when
an adverse financial event occurs. Using cards to cope with unexpected expenses or a low income may increase the chances of bankruptcy as an
ultimate outcome to hardship. 7 Thus, the role of credit cards in financial
71. Three decades of Consumer Bankruptcy Project research shows that a substantial majority of consumers experience either a decline in income, illness or injury to self or a dependent, or a
family breakup in the two years before bankruptcy. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 186;
WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 11, at 84; Elizabeth Warren, Financial Collapse and Class Status:
Who Goes Bankrupt?, 41 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115, 126-27 (2003).
The 2004 median household income was $44,389. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL
STATES:
2007, at 447 tbl.673 (2007), available at
OF
THE
UNITED
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/07statab/income.pdf.
73. Existing family-level data on credit card use and bankruptcy is limited. See supra text
accompanying notes 70-71. The last extended discussion of credit cards and bankruptcy was based
on data collected in 1991. See, e.g., p. 60-69; SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note I1, at 285. Given the
growth in card use in America and the continued marketing of cards to subprime customers with
risky credit, these data may be outdated. More recently, Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Tyagi deemphasized credit cards as a "cause" of bankruptcy. WARREN & TYAGI, supra note I I, at 131, 230 n.28.
72.
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distress could be an incremental one. This card-driven effect should not distract from the primacy of income for household well-being. Steady income
facilitates planning for future financial problems, while income shocks
make credit card spending and its deferral of consequences more attractive. 75
An unexplored element of this dynamic is the role of savings and its relationship with card use. Mann does speculate that the real harm of credit
cards may be that they lead consumers to divert income toward spending,
rather than savings.76 He then somewhat blithely dismisses the relationship
between savings and credit cards, deeming it of "little concern" to his analysis (p. 56). Yet savings of a few months' income could help consumers
weather a moderate reduction or temporary stoppage of income.77 Savings
are also a vital cushion against unexpected expenses. The dichotomy between spending and saving appears crucial to preventing financial distress,
but the connection between spending and saving remains a mystery.
The policy reality is that it is easier to focus on credit cards as a tangible
marker that accompanies bankruptcy than to tackle directly the problems of
income volatility, stagnant wages, and spiraling health care expenses. The
latter focus raises fundamental questions about whether individuals or society should bear the risks of a market economy. Credit card reform seems
imminent. The proposals in ChargingAhead merit consideration by Congress. They are grounded in empirical reality about card use, enhancing the
chances that the reforms will work in a desirable way and limit undesirable
side effects of regulation. However, the data on cardless families warn
against excessive optimism about the potential of card reform, serving as a
reminder that the larger problems driving financial distress are risks unrelated to card use.

Jean Braucher has pointed to the limitations of Warren and Tyagi's analysis of these data and suggested alternate interpretations. Jean Braucher, Middle-Class Knowledge, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J.
193, 211-16 (2004).
74.

See Braucher, supra note 73, at 202-03; Porter & Thorne, supranote 34, at 94-98.

75.

JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN JoBs, FAMILIES,
HEALTH CARE, AND RETIREMENT-AND How You CAN FIGHT BACK 27-29 (2006) (describing a

fivefold increase in income instability between 1970 and 1990 and attributing that risk to job insecurity, erosion of state benefits, and other new risks to American households).
76.

P. 49 ("Furthermore, excessive credit card spending or debt might lead to a reduction in

savings.").
77. WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 11, at 24; see generally G. VICTOR HALLMAN & JERRY S.
ROSENBLOOM, PERSONAL FINANCIAL PLANNING (2003); LIz PULLIAM WESTON, DEAL WITH YOUR
DEBT: THE RIGHT WAY TO MANAGE YOUR BILL$ AND PAY OFF WHAT YOU OWE (2006); JOHN L.
WHITE, I'M IN DEBT, OVER 40, WITH No RETIREMENT SAVINGS: HELP! (2004). The importance of
savings can be overstated. Severe and permanent hardships are difficult or impossible to insure
against with savings, and private insurance for such events is often expensive or unavailable. For
example, an infant with profound special needs may severely strain a family's financial resources for
decades.
78. See pp. 50-51 ("Similarly, deferred consumption and savings can provide a backup cushion against risks for which insurance is not available.").
79.

H.R. 873, 110th Cong. (lst Sess. 2007); S. 1176, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); S. 1309,

110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 254-55.
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B. Advancing the Regulatory Agenda

As an adjunct to combating harmful effects of cards, reforms could harness consumers' preferences for plastic payment to reduce financial distress.
Proponents and opponents of credit cards and other payment cards agree on
their tremendous power to alter consumer transactions. My proposals identify card research or card reform that exploits cards' power.
The first is informational. Credit cards generate more detailed transactional records than other forms of payment, such as cash or checks. Credit
card companies have the ability to categorize these expenditures by type, 8° to
measure how the frequency and value of transactions change in response to
changes in interest rates or in the period before a customer bankruptcy, and
to compare card use across demographic and economic groups. Such data
would be complete and accurate, two significant improvements over the
current individual-level data. However, card issuers' data are proprietary,
and companies have only infrequently granted access to researchers.8' Recent efforts to improve the quality of public statistics on credit cards, while a2
definite move in the right direction, would not provide family-level data.1
Research needs aside, the agencies charged with regulating credit cards such
as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency cannot intelligently evaluate the utility and safety of a lending product without knowing, in any
meaningful sense, how that product works. As credit cards have replaced
cash and paper checks, the opportunities for data documenting consumer
financial decisions and their relationship to financial distress have increased.
Yet this potential remains untapped, leaving policymakers to operate on assumptions or aggregate analyses about card effects.
A second innovation would focus on encouraging savings. New card
products attempt to draw on the allure of cards to stimulate savings, typically providing a very small contribution from the card issuer to a savings
account.83 These cards function as an alternative to rewards programs, which
Mann criticizes for unduly influencing consumers to prefer credit cards to
debit cards." The current "savings" cards are fairly useless because of their
80. Indeed, some companies provide annual statements to cardholders that show a breakdown of one's total spending by category. See Tyler Thomas, Use Your Chase Credit Card as a
Budgeting Tool, CREDIT CARD BLOG, Sept. 18, 2007, http://blog.creditcardflyers.com/2007/09/18/
use-your-chase-credit-card-as-a-budgeting-tool/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
81.
See, e.g., Agarwal et al., supra note 42, at 15; Michael E. Staten & Fred H. Cale, The
Impact of Opt-In Privacy Rules on Retail Credit Markets: A Case Study of MBNA, 52 DUKE L.J.
745, 772 (2003).
82. See Stop Unfair Practices in Credit Cards Act of 2007, S. 1395, 110th Cong. (1st Sess.
2007); Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2007, H.R. 1461, 110th
Cong (1st Sess. 2007).
83. Dana Dratch, 'Spend to Save' Credit Card: Can it Work for You?, BANKRATE.COM, Oct. 1,
2006, http://www.bankrate.com/brn/news/sav/2006savmg/savings-cardsal.asp?caret=17
(last visited Sept. 8, 2007) (describing variety of savings-linked credit cards).
84.
Mann recommends banning reward programs as a tool to curb imprudent credit card use,
observing that these programs "are a major part of the competition by which different issuers retain
customers and encourage them to spend." P. 167.
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small effect. However, the savings concept could be more deeply integrated
into credit card transactions, for example by affirmatively prompting consumers to make a savings contribution at the point of sale. As payroll cards
become more popular,85 a type of "swipe to save" initiative that allows a
transfer from the card to a savings account to occur automatically upon the
card's first use would deter an impulse to spend the card to zero. To the extent that card use is a habit, strategies for savings that tap into the
convenience and efficiency of cards could be fruitful. If regulators had data
on the efficacy of the new savings cards, they could begin to evaluate the
usefulness of this proposal.
Advances in credit card technology may permit improved disclosures at
the point of sale. Mann describes the Japanese system of ikkai barai in
which a cardholder must make an affirmative decision about whether a
transaction will be immediately paid or borrowed-and if the latter, over
what period. 86 He proposes adapting this idea of point-of-sale disclosure to
prevent consumers from mistakenly incurring fees for over-the-limit transactions (p. 163). This idea has great merit, harnessing card technology and
Americans' card habit to improve financial practices. I would suggest that
advising consumers of the amount of their current card balance at the point
of sale could have a further benefit that Mann does not identify, which is to
dampen additional spending. For example, I speculate that consumers may
use their cards less in the days immediately after they receive their card
statements after the shock of seeing the monthly bill. Point-of-sale balance
disclosures would mirror the practice of some automated teller machines,
which include the account balance on the receipt after any transaction.
While the current thrust of card reform is to curb those practices seen as
most egregious, 87 the relationship between credit card use and bankruptcy
requires reform aimed at more subtle alterations of the entire payment card
market and consumer economy. Mann's novel proposals meet these criteria,
but will not alone suffice to make substantial inroads in reducing the incidence and severity of financial distress in America.
CONCLUSION

Credit cards are a global phenomenon with consistent macroeconomic
effects, not a mere sign of American prodigality to be attacked with moral
castigation about the good old days of cash. Embracing card technology for
its positive transactional benefits requires attention to the possible harms of
cards. Mann's analysis reveals a consistent, cross-jurisdictional pattern of
85.

See Samuel Frumkin et al., Payroll Cards: An Innovative Productfor Reaching the Un-

banked and Underbanked, COMMUNITY

DEVS. INSIGHTS, June 2005, at 1, 2, available at

http://www.occ.treas.gov/Cdd/payrollcards.pdf; Gail Hillebrand, Questions for Employees to Ask
About Payroll Cards, CONSUMERSUNION.ORG, Jan. 2006, http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/
core.financialservices/000920.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2007) (advising consumers to ask about
using a payroll card to save).
86.

P. 163; Mann, supra note 21, at 1074-75.

87.

See S. 1395, 110th Cong.
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undesirable credit card effects. His research indicates that credit cards
stimulate excessive borrowing and that card use correlates with higher bankruptcy rates. Serious policymaking should abandon wholesale arguments
against credit cards and incorporate Mann's recommendation to shift nonborrowing card use to debit cards.
The new data presented in this Review highlight the importance of extending credit card research to document the variations in card use among
families. The finding that cardless families can struggle with financial problems emphasizes the importance of approaching credit card reform as only a
single building block in constructing a defense against bankruptcy and
financial distress. Further research would help isolate the importance of factors such as income and savings in shielding families from bankruptcy and
identify how card use intersects with families' financial stability.
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